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Why Uber is an information society service
Case Note to CJEU 20 December 2017 C-434/15 (Asociación profesional Élite Taxi)
I. Introduction
The e-commerce Directive1 has the aim to create a legal
framework that ensures the free movement of information
society services between Member States.2 Key concept in this
directive is the concept ‘information society service’.
At first glance, it is not completely clear what constitutes an
information society service. Probably, the drafters attempted
to keep this concept broad and without reference to any
specific applications, so that it would not be outdated by the
fast developments in information technology.
The concept aims to cover a wide range of services related to
internet access, hosting services and electronic contracting.
Recital 18 of the e-commerce Directive offers some guidance,
stating that information society services span a wide range of
economic activities which take place on-line, such as the on-
line sale of goods and the online provision of information.
One would think that, if anything, the online ride booking-
application offered by Uber classifies as an information so-
ciety service. This application enables drivers to offer trans-
port services and enables passengers to book a ride with these
drivers. However, in a recent judgement the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU) decided that the application
that enables non-professional drivers to connect and contract
with passengers is not an information society service.3 The
CJEU considers the booking-application to be an integral
part of an overall service whose main component is a trans-
port service as meant in the Services Directive4 and therefore
must not be classified as an information society service.5
As a consequence, the booking-application does not fall with-
in the scope of the e-commerce Directive, which contains
inter alia the principle of freedom to provide information
society services.6 As transport services are also explicitly ex-
cluded from the application of the Services Directive, and the
principles of freedom of establishment and freedom to pro-
vide services laid down in that directive, the Member States
retain their national authority to regulate the activities of
Uber.
In this article I will argue that the decision of the CJEU to
exclude the booking application from the scope of the e-
commerce Directive is incorrect and unnecessary. Possibly,
this decision was prompted by the desire to ensure that
Member States can apply and enforce national rules relating
to transport services. Yet, classification of Uber as an infor-
mation society service would not have precluded this.
To demonstrate this, I will first set out (in part 2) the defini-
tion and aim of the concept of information society service.
The e-commerce Directive provides (amongst others things)
two basic principles for information society services: the
home state control-principle and the principle of freedom to
provide information society services.7 The scope and in parti-
cular the limitations of these principles are discussed in part
3. The practical implications of the limited scope of the
principles are illustrated by the decision of the CJEU in Ker
Optika8 (set out in part 4). This sets the stage for the discus-
sion of the Courts’ decision in Asociación Profesional Élite
Taxi v Uber Systems Spain in parts 5 and 6. I will argue (in
parts 7 to 9) that it was neither necessary nor desirable to
exclude the Uber booking-application from the scope of the
e-commerce Directive. Part 10 contains an outlook on the
consequences of the CJEU-decision for the classification of
electronic platforms in general as information society ser-
vices. Part 11 summarizes my conclusions.
II. Scope and purpose of the concept information
society service
The e-commerce Directive does not define the concept infor-
mation society service, but refers to the definition of article 1
(2) of Directive 98/34 laying down a procedure for the provi-
sion of information in the field of technical standards.9 A
consolidated version of Directive 98/34 was published in
2015 (Directive (EU) 2015/1535) which is a restatement
including all changes made to Directive 98/34 after it was
issued.10
According to article 1(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 an
information society service is any service normally provided
for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at
the individual request of a recipient of services. The elements
of this definition are further defined in the same provision.
‘At a distance’ means that the service is provided without the
parties being simultaneously present. ‘By electronic means’
means that the service is sent initially and received at its
destination by means of electronic equipment for the proces-
sing (including digital compression) and storage of data, and
entirely transmitted, conveyed and received by wire, by radio,
by optical means or by other electromagnetic means. ‘At the
individual request of a recipient of a service’ means that the
service is provided through the transmission of data on in-
dividual request.11
The remuneration that is required is to be interpreted
broadly. It is not necessary that the recipient of the service
pays for the online service. The definition also includes online
services that are not remunerated, but constitute an economic
activity, such as online information, commercial communica-
tions, search tools, access and retrieval of data.12 The CJEU
1 * Assistant professor of private law, VU Amsterdam. E-Mail:
m. y.schaub@vu.nl.
Directive (EC) 2000/31 on certain legal aspects of information society
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market
[2000] OJ L 178/1 (Directive on electronic commerce).
2 Recital 8 Directive (EC) 2000/31.
3 Case C-434/15, Asociación profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain
[2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:981.
4 Directive (EC) 2006/123 on Services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L
376/36.
5 Case C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain
para 40.
6 Article 3(2) of Directive (EC) 2000/31.
7 Articles 3(1) and (2) of Directive (EC) 2000/31.
8 Case C-108/09, Ker-Optika [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:725.
9 Directive (EC) 98/34 laying down a procedure for the provision of
Information Society Services [1998] OJ L 204/37, as amended by Direc-
tive (EC) 98/48 [1998] OJ L 217/18.
10 Directive (EU) 2015/1535 laying down a procedure for the provision of
information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Informa-
tion Society Services (codification) [2015] OJ L 241/1.
11 On these elements in relation to online auctions see: Christine Riefa,
Consumer Protection and Online Auction Platforms (Ashgate 2015) 58-
61.
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confirmed in Sotiris Papasavvas that it covers the provision
of online services where income is generated by advertise-
ments posted on the website.13
Annex I of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 contains an indicative
list of services that are not considered to be information
society services. This annex lists inter alia the consultation of
an electronic catalogue in a shop, electronic games in a video
arcade, automatic ticket dispensing machines, toll booths,
television and radio broadcasting and televised teletext.
The definition aims to include a wide range of activities
related to internet within the scope of the e-commerce Direc-
tive. According to recital 18 of this Directive, it covers online
economic activities such as the selling of goods, offering on-
line information and search engines as well as services con-
sisting of the transmission of information via communication
networks, access providers and hosting providers. In L’Oréal
v eBay the CJEU stated that an internet service consisting in
facilitating relations between sellers and buyers of goods is,
in principle, a service for the purposes of Directive 2000/31.14
Activities such as the delivery of goods and the provision of
services off-line are explicitly not covered.15
If a service falls within the scope of the e-commerce Directive,
the provider of that service must comply with the general
transparency requirements of article 5-7 of the e-commerce
Directive and the rules relating to electronic contracting of
articles 9-11. For intermediary service providers16 articles 12-
15 of the e-commerce Directive relating to the liability for
information transmitted or stored by the service provider are
relevant.
Besides these substantive rules concerning the provision of
the service, the e-commerce Directive contains several general
principles. First, there is the home state control principle,
which entails that the Member States shall ensure that the
information society services provided by a service provider
established on its territory comply with the national provi-
sions applicable in the Member State in questions which fall
within the coordinated field.17 Secondly, Member States may
not, for reasons falling within the coordinated field, restrict
the freedom to provide information society services from
another Member State, which is referred to as the principle of
freedom to provide information society services.18 And
thirdly, Member States shall ensure that the taking up and
pursuit of the activity of an information society service provi-
der may not be made subject to prior authorization or any
other requirement having equivalent effect, referred to as the
principle excluding prior authorization.19
If these principles were applied unconditionally, providers of
information society services would enjoy far-reaching free-
dom without having to worry about interference from var-
ious Member States and about various authorization
schemes. However, a closer look reveals that the scope of
these principles is limited.
III. The limited freedom to provide information
society services
The scope of the home state control principle and the free-
dom to provide information society services is limited in
several ways. The Annex to the e-commerce Directive (titled:
derogations from article 3) lists eight topics that are excluded
from the home state control and principle of freedom to
provide information society services. Amongst other things
this list includes copyright, emission of electronic money, the
freedom of the parties to choose the law applicable to their
contract and contractual obligations concerning consumer
contracts.
Article 3(4) of the e-commerce Directive allows Member
States to derogate from the freedom to provide information
society services if certain conditions are met. For example,
derogations are allowed if this is necessary for reasons of
public policy, the protection of public health, public security
and the protection of consumers.20
The most important limitation arises from the extent of the
coordinated field. The home state control principle and the
principle of freedom to provide information society services
only apply to issues that fall within this field. This means the
scope of the coordinated field in essence determines the im-
pact of these principles.
The coordinated field concerns requirements laid down in
Member States’ legal systems applicable to information so-
ciety service providers21 or information society services, re-
gardless of whether they are of a general nature or specifically
designed for them.22 The coordinated field includes require-
ments in respect of the taking up of the activity of an infor-
mation society service such as requirements concerning quali-
fications, authorization or notification and requirements re-
lating to the pursuit of the activity such as requirements
concerning the behavior of the service provider, the quality
or content of the service.23 The definition of the coordinated
field is quite vague, as with the concept of information
society service, the extent of this concept is not clear at first
sight.
However, it is explicitly stipulated that the coordinated field
does not cover requirements such as requirements applicable
to goods as such, requirements to the delivery of goods and
requirements applicable to services not provided by electronic
means.24 This limited extent is underlined by recital 21 of the
e-commerce Directive stating that the coordinated field only
covers requirements relating to online activities such as online
information, online advertising, online shopping, online con-
tracting and does not concern Member States’ legal require-
ments relating to goods such as safety standards, labeling
obligations, liability for goods, or Member States’ require-
ments relating to the delivery or the transport of goods.
The principle excluding prior authorization is limited by
article 4(2) of the e-commerce Directive stating that this
principle is without prejudice to authorization schemes which
are not specifically and exclusively targeted at information
society services.
12 Recital 18 of Directive (EC) 2000/31.
13 Case C-291/13, Sotiris Papasavvas [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2209.
14 Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v eBay [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:474,
para. 109.
15 Recital 18 of Directive (EC) 2000/31.
16 If the service provider provides access to a network or transmits or
stores information that is provided by others.
17 Article 3(1) of Directive (EC) 2000/31.
18 Article 3(2) of Directive (EC) 2000/31.
19 Article 4(1) of Directive (EC) 2000/31.
20 Derogations should be proportionate and taken only after the home
state of the service provider has failed to take (adequate) measures and
the Commission must be notified.
21 Any natural or legal person providing an information society service,
article 2 sub b Directive (EC) 2000/31.
22 Article 2 sub h Directive (EC) 2000/31.
23 Article 2 sub h under i Directive (EC) 2000/31.
24 Article 2 sub h under ii Directive (EC) 2000/31.
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IV. Ker-Optika
The scope of the coordinated field establishes a division
between offline and online activities. Online activities are
covered by the home state principle and the freedom to
provide information society services and offline activities are
not. This online-offline divide is confirmed by the CJEU-
decision in Ker-Optika.25 The case concerns the online selling
of contact lenses by Ker-Optika. The Hungarian governmen-
tal authority prohibited this, because Hungarian health regu-
lations prescribed that contact lenses could only be sold in a
shop which specializes in the sale of medical devices or by
home delivery for final consumption and cannot, as Ker-
Optika did, be sold via internet.
Ker-Optika, relying on the national implementation of the e-
commerce Directive in Hungary, argued that the online sale
of contact lenses cannot be restricted. The Hungarian author-
ity in turn referred to recital 18 of the directive claiming that
the selling of contact lenses requires a medical examination
and therefore cannot be an information society service. The
last sentence of this recital reads: ‘activities which by their
nature cannot be carried out at a distance and by electronic
means, such as the statutory auditing of company accounts
and medical advice requiring the physical examination of a
patient are not information society services’.
The CJEU ruled that national provisions that prohibit online
selling of contact lenses fall within the scope of the coordi-
nated field.26 The CJEU also observed that the coordinated
field does not cover requirements applicable to the supply of
goods which are sold online, thereby confirming the online-
offline divide made by the e-commerce Directive.27 This
means online selling of contact lenses cannot be prohibited,
but national requirements pertaining to the lenses themselves
or the delivery of the lenses are allowed, at least as far as the
e-commerce Directive is concerned.28
Subsequently, the CJEU examined if the selling or supply of
contact lenses may be subject to the requirement that the
customer first obtains medical advice. By doing this, the
CJEU meant to determine if the activities of Ker-Optika fall
within the last sentence of recital 18 of the e-commerce
Directive: activities which by their very nature cannot be
carried out at a distance or by electronic means (such as
medical advice requiring a physical examination) are not
information society services. The CJEU states that if medical
advice requiring a physical examination of a customer is
inseparable from the selling of contact lenses, the fact that
such advice is required means that such selling does not,
ultimately fall within the scope of the e-commerce Directive.
In my view the last sentence of recital 18 emphasizes that
some activities cannot be information society services, but
this does not necessarily mean that an online activity intrinsi-
cally related to those offline activities cannot be an informa-
tion society service. What is more, the e-commerce Directive
seems to operate from the assumption that an offline-online
divide should be made, even where offline and online activ-
ities are inseparable. For example, without online selling
there cannot be an obligation for an offline delivery. Online
selling explicitly falls within the scope of the e-commerce
Directive, but the offline delivery does not.
In any event, the CJEU finds that an ophthalmological exam-
ination is not inseparable from the selling of contact lenses,
because lenses can be sold based on a prescription made prior
to the sale. The unfortunate presumption made by the CJEU
in relation to recital 18 (that services that are inseparable
from activities that are inherently offline cannot be informa-
tion society services) does not have any consequences for the
outcome of the case.
V. Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems
Spain
The case Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi concerns the use
of the booking application provided by Uber where non-
professional drivers (using their own car) can offer transport
services to persons looking for transport (UberPop). A taxi
company from Barcelona (Elite Taxi) started legal proceed-
ings against Uber seeking a prohibition of these activities of
Uber in Barcelona, because neither Uber nor the drivers had
the licenses and authorization required under the local regu-
lation on taxi services. The questions of the referring court
concern the classification of the service in order to determine
the applicability of the e-commerce Directive, the Services
Directive and the principle on freedom to provide services
under primary EU law.
The CJEU first observes that in principle the service consist-
ing of connecting a driver to a person who wishes to make a
journey is a separate service from the service consisting of the
transport (the physical act of moving persons) and that each
of those services can be linked to different directives or provi-
sions of the TFEU treaty.29 Second, according to the CJEU
the intermediary service that enables the transfer by means of
a smartphone application of information concerning the
booking of a transport service between the passenger and the
driver meets, in principle, the criteria for classification as an
information society service.30 And third, non-public urban
transport service, such as taxi services, must be classified as a
service in the field of transport, as meant by article 2(2) of
the Services Directive.31
However, the CJEU then states that because the intermediary
service forms an integral part of an overall service whose
main component is a transport service, the booking applica-
tion must not be classified as an information society service,
but as a service in the field of transport.32
The classification of the services of Uber as transportation
services means they are covered by article 58(1) of the TFEU
on the freedom to provide services in the field of transport
and shall be governed by the provisions of the Title relating
to transport and not article 56 TFEU on the freedom to
provide services in general. As there is no EU law relating to
the provision of non-public urban transport and services that
are inherently linked to that, it is for the Member States to
regulate the conditions under which intermediation services
such as the Uber booking-app can operate.
25 Case C-108/09, Ker-Optika [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:725.
26 Para 28 Ker-Optika.
27 Paras 29-31 Ker-Optika.
28 The CJEU also assessed the Hungarian regulations under primary EU
law in relation to the freedom of movement of goods and ruled that
national legislation which authorizes the selling of contact lenses only in
shops which specialize in medical devices is a restriction to the free
movement of goods which is not allowed, see paras 41-78 Ker Optika.
For an analysis of the case in relation to eHealth Services see: Erik
Vollebregt, ‘Consequences of the EU Ker-Optika case for e-commerce in
Physical Medical Devices and Apps for eHealth Services’ [2012] 02 EJBI
34-39.
29 Para 34 Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain.
30 Para 35 Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain.
31 Para 36 Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain.
32 Para 40 Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain. The
CJEU repeated this decision in case C-320/16, Uber France SAS [2018]
ECLI:EU:C:2018:221.
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VI. An active intermediary
The terms of Uber state that the services of Uber consist of
providing a platform that allows users to connect with inde-
pendent external providers of transportation or logistical
services. The terms stress (with the use of capital letters) that
Uber should not be considered as a provider of transporta-
tion services.33 Nevertheless, the CJEU finds that Uber in fact
does more than providing an intermediary service of connect-
ing drivers and passengers.34 The conclusion of the CJEU that
Uber offers urban transport services is based on several ob-
servations concerning the characteristics of the service provi-
sion of Uber.35
The Court notes that without Uber, the non-professional
drivers would not be led to provide transport services and
potential passengers would not be able to use the services of
these drivers. Supply and demand of these particular services
are created by Uber. More important is the fact that Uber
exerts decisive influence over the conditions under which the
transport services are provided. Uber determines the maxi-
mum fare, receives the payment from the passengers which is
partly transferred to the driver and partly kept as payment
for the use of the booking-application, and Uber exerts a
certain control over the quality of the vehicles, the drivers
and the conduct of the drivers, which can result in exclusion
of the driver from the app.36
In cases in the United States and the UK the control of Uber
over the drivers has been a factor to classify Uber as an
employer of the drivers rather than an intermediary between
independent drivers and their passengers.37 This matter, how-
ever, is not expressly addressed by the CJEU.38
The active role with regard to the content and the perfor-
mance of the contracts concluded via the app is what tips the
scale. If Uber was neutral, that is to say if Uber did no more
than list drivers allowing passengers to choose and contact
the driver of their choice and allow drivers to state the price
and conditions of their services, then the app would truly be
‘just’ an intermediary service provider connecting drivers and
passengers.
VII. The legal classification of composite services
The urban transport services are intrinsically linked with the
booking-app. According to the Court the application must be
regarded as forming an integral part of an overall service
whose main component is a transport service and therefore
must not be classified as an information society service.39 The
judgement does not elaborate on why the classification of the
activities of Uber as a transport service entails that the book-
ing-app cannot be classified as an information society service.
The ruling is in line with the Opinion of AG Szpunar, whose
argumentation is more extensive.40 The AG argued that only
online activities with self-standing economic value can be
classified as information society services. According to the
AG if services comprise electronic and non-electronic ele-
ments, the online activities can only be regarded as entirely
transmitted by electronic means, when the supply of the
service which is not made by electronic means is economic-
ally independent of the online service.41 To justify this the
AG refers to the objective of the e-commerce Directive which
is to liberalize the information society services.
The main argument of the AG seems to be that online
services intrinsically related to offline services fall outside the
scope of the e-commerce Directive, because the liberalization
of such online activities would be useless if the supply of that
online service could not be freely made due to regulations
affecting the related offline services.42
Indeed regulation of offline activities related to online activ-
ities effectively limits the freedom to provide the online ser-
vice. Although I agree with the AG that liberalization of
online activities has little effect if offline activities related to
the online service can still be restricted by Member State law,
this is the consequence of the online-offline divide expressly
made by the e-commerce Directive and illustrated by the
CJEU ruling in Ker-Optika. This does not mean that such
services fall outside the scope of the directive altogether.
It seems to me that the division that can be made between the
booking-app and the performance of the transportation is
comparable to the division that is made between online sell-
ing of goods and the subsequent delivery of those goods.
According to recital 18 of the e-commerce Directive online
selling of goods explicitly falls within the scope of the e-
commerce Directive, while the delivery of the goods falls out-
side the scope. The AG finds this is different from the service
provision of Uber. In his view the essential components of the
transaction are the offer and its acceptance. Offer and accep-
tance and often payment are performed by electronic means
and fall within the definition of information society services.
The AG considers the subsequent delivery of the goods sim-
ply the performance of a contractual obligation, so that the
rules applying to the delivery should not affect the provision
of the main service, which is online contracting.43
33 Article 2 of the terms of Uber <www.uber.com/nl/legal/terms/nl/> ac-
cessed 01 March 2018.
34 Para 37 Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain. See
also the Opinion of AG Szpunar, par 44: Uber does more than match
supply and demand. It creates supply and lays down rules concerning
the essential characteristics of the supply and organizes how it works.
35 German courts decided in a similar manner: Hamburgisches OVG,
Beschluss vom 24 September 2014, Az. 3 Bs 175/14, and VG Berlin,
Beschluss vom 26 September 2014, Az. 11 L 353.14.
36 Para 39 Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain. A
description of the functioning of Uber can be found in many publica-
tions, see for example: Marie J. Sørensen, ‘Private Law perspectives on
Platform Services. Uber – a business model in search of a new contrac-
tual legal frame?’ [2016] 01 EuCML 15-19.
37 Aslam v Uber BV [2017] I. R. L.R. 4 (28 October 2016), O’Connor
et. al. v. Uber Technologies Inc et. al. No. C-13-3826 EMC, United
States District Court, N.D. California (11 March 2015).
38 Marie J. Sørensen, ‘Private Law perspectives on Platform Services. Uber
– a business model in search of a new contractual legal frame?’ [2016]
01 EuCML 15-19, argues that if Uber qualifies as an employer of its
drivers, the passengers enter into a contact with Uber as a transportation
service provider.
39 Par. 40 Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain. The
Court finds that this classification is confirmed by the broad interpreta-
tion of the concept ‘services in the field of transport’, including any
service linked to any physical act of moving persons or goods from one
place to another by means of transport, see case C-168/14, Grupo
Itevelesa [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:685.
40 Opinion AG Szpunar of 11 May 2017, case C-434/15, Asociación
Profesional Élite Taxi [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:364.
41 Paras 32-33 Opinion AG Szpunar Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi.
The AG repeats this point of view in his Opinion of 4 July 2017 in case
C-320/16, Uber France SAS [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:511, this case con-
cerns a related matter, namely the question if a French provision affect-
ing the service provision of Uber is a technical regulation in the meaning
of Directive (EC) 98/34.
42 Paras 31-32 Opinion AG Szpunar Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi.
AG notes at 65 that the fact that the related offline activities can be
regulated and prohibited undermines the entire rationale behind the
freedom to provide information society services as organized by the
directive based on the supervision of the legality of the providers opera-
tions by the Member State where he is established and the recognition of
that supervision by other Member States.
43 Par 36 Opinion AG Szpunar Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi. With
regard to the classification of the selling of goods to consumers as
services see case C-31/16, Visser Vastgoed Beleggingen BV v Raad van
de gemeente Appingedam [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:44. The Court
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I certainly see differences between the delivery of goods and
the provision of transport services; however both constitute,
essentially, the performance of a contractual obligation.
When the contract is concluded electronically this should fall
within the scope of the e-commerce Directive. The informa-
tion society service that is provided consists of the possibility
to contract online. When a trader (such as a seller or a
transportation service provider) engages in online selling or
advertising, this trader gets a second qualification: the seller
or service provider also becomes an information society ser-
vice provider.44
VIII. Uber as both a transport service provider and an
information society service provider
In my opinion, any trade-related online activity, even if it is
merely incidental secondary or preparatory in nature and
even if it is not economically independent from the offline
performance, is an information society service.45 This is as-
suming that the main element of this concept is that the
online activity should represent an economic activity and that
the fact that this activity is secondary or preparatory is of no
relevance.
An online booking application (independent or not) always
adds economic value, as the possibility to order or book
online has economic value for any company wanting to sell
goods or provide services. This approach is supported by
recital 18 of the e-commerce Directive which mentions ser-
vices giving rise to on-line contracting as an example of what
constitutes an information society service.46 The classification
of Uber as a transport service provider should not preclude
the classification of the online booking application as an
information society service, because the fact that both the
online service and the offline service are inseparable is not
relevant for this classification.
The online booking application of Uber meets all the criteria
of the definition of information society service and therefore
should be classified as such.47 This would mean that the
provision of the online booking application falls within the
scope of the freedom to provide information society services,
but the provision of the transport services can still be re-
stricted.48 In the final remarks of his Opinion in Asociación
Profesional Élite Taxi AG Szpunar also observes that if the
Court were to decide that the booking application classifies
as an information society service, this would not preclude
requirements relating to the activity of transport, since the
service of drivers falls outside the scope of Directive 2000/
31.49
The offline regulation of course affects the freedom of the
online service, even to the extent that the freedom to provide
the information society service is rendered useless due to the
license requirements for urban transport, but the application
of the e-commerce Directive would not be completely obso-
lete. The directive contains several transparency require-
ments, including the obligation to provide easy, direct en
permanent access to information on name, address, contact
details and on the location where the service provider is
registered. The directive also contains rules related to the
treatment of online contracts and lists requirements regarding
the online ordering procedure.50 If Uber (and their drivers)
were to obtain the relevant licenses for urban transport, and
were classified as both a transport service and an information
society service, Uber would have to comply with these obliga-
tions.
When applying the substantive rules of the e-commerce Di-
rective to online platforms, the obligations relating to online
contracting apply in first instance to the contracts concluded
for the use of the platform. Generally the users of platforms
(both providers and customers) will have to create an account
in order to be able to use the platform (the platform-agree-
ment). Subsequently contracts are concluded with other users
via the platform (in the case of Uber: online transportation
agreements). As Uber is seen as the provider of the transpor-
tation services, the obligations relating to online contracting
of Uber concern both the platform agreement and the online
transportation agreements.
Strictly speaking a neutral platform operator would not have
the obligation to fulfill the information requirements relating
to the contracts concluded between the users via the plat-
form; however in my opinion such neutral intermediary plat-
forms should have an obligation to ensure their platform
allows the users that offer goods or services to comply with
their information duties.
Furthermore, the information society service provider can
under certain conditions rely on the rules concerning the
exemption from liability of intermediary service providers.51
From the perspective of consumer protection the exclusion of
the booking-app from the e-commerce Directive is undesir-
able. This exclusion entails that the transparency require-
ments and the rules relating to online contracting are not
applicable at all, even if the relevant licenses were obtained.
As transport services are also excluded from the scope of
applicability of the Services Directive, the transparency re-
quirements of this directive equally do not apply.52
There is still a substantial amount of consumer protection in
place regarding the services provided by Uber. For any con-
tractual relation between a professional party and a consu-
mer the Directive on unfair contract terms applies53 as well as
the Directive on unfair commercial practices54 and some rules
decided that retail trade in goods falls within the concept of ‘service’
within the meaning of Directive (EG) 2006/123.
44 Wendehorst refers to this as the dual role of online shop operators: seller
with respect to the goods; service provider with respect to the service of
offering the goods online or: service provider with regard to the service
that is offered and information society service by offering these services
online. See Christiane Wendehorst, ‘Platform Intermediary Services and
Duties under the E-commerce Directive and the Consumer Rights Direc-
tive’ [2016] 01 EuCML par 2 a. The author argues that it is beyond
doubt that the operating of an online intermediary platform as such
qualifies as an information society service.
45 As opposed to the point of departure in par 37 of the Opinion AG
Szpunar Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi.
46 The view is supported by Christiane Wendehorst, ‘Platform intermedi-
ary Services and Duties under the E-commerce Directive and the Con-
sumer Rights Directive’ [2016] 01 EuCML par 3 a; Anne de Vries-
Stotijn, ‘De status van Uber – Wie betaalt er aan het eind van de
rit?’[2016] 03 TvC 101-102; Christine Riefa, Consumer Protection and
Online Auction Platforms (Ashgate 2015) 58-61.
47 See also: Anne de Vries-Stotijn, ‘Ontwikkelingen in het EU-recht; Uber
een vervoersaanbieder?’ [2017] 04 TvC 176.
48 Offering transport via UberPOP without a permit is prohibited in the
Netherlands, both the UberPOP drivers and Uber (because it shared in
the profits of these activities) were held to be in violation of the Dutch
law on transport of persons (Wet personenvervoer 2000), see CBB, 8
December 2014, NL:CBB:2014:450. A series of national legal reports
on Uber is published by EuCML 2015, issues 1-4.
49 Par 88 Opinion AG Szpunar Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi.
50 Articles 5-7 and article 9-11 of Directive (EC) 2000/31.
51 Articles 12-15 of Directive (EC) 2000/31.
52 Passenger transport services are also partly excluded from the scope of
the Consumer Rights Directive, article 3(3) sub k Directive (EU) 2011/
83.
53 Council Directive (EEC) 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts
[1993] OJ L 95/29.
54 Directive (EC) 2005/29 concerning unfair business-to-consumer com-
mercial practices in the internal market [2005] OJ L 149/22.
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of the Consumer Rights Directive.55 Passenger transport ser-
vices are excluded from the applicability of the Consumer
Rights Directive, but articles 8(2), 19 and 22 of the Consu-
mer Rights Directive still apply.56 Nevertheless the exclusion
of Uber and possibly in the wake of the CJEU-decision more
active service platforms57 from the e-commerce Directive
means a diminishment in consumer protection as well as an
unnecessary fragmentation of the legal framework regarding
e-commerce.
IX. Concurrent applicability of the e-commerce and
the Services Directive
The reasoning of both the CJEU and the AG in Asociación
Profesional Élite Taxi reflects the reasoning adopted in pri-
mary EU law in relation to activities that fall within two
fundamental freedoms. If a national measure affects both the
free movement of goods and the freedom to provide services,
it will be examined in relation to only one of these fundamen-
tal freedoms, if it appears that one of them is entirely second-
ary in relation to the other and may be considered together
with it.58
This approach does not fit the situation in the case of Uber,
where the activities of the trader fall within the scope of two
directives. If classification of the facts results in the conclu-
sion that more than one directive applies, it should first be
examined if these directives contain rules specifying the rela-
tion with the other applicable secondary instrument.
Article 3(1) of the Services Directive states that if the provi-
sions of the Services Directive conflict with a provision of
another Community act governing specific aspects of access
to or exercise of a service activity in specific sectors or for
specific professions, the provision of the other Community
act shall prevail and shall apply to those specific sectors or
professions.59 Following this provision it must first be estab-
lished if the rules of the e-commerce Directive and the Ser-
vices Directive conflict. If there is no conflict, there is no
impediment to apply both instruments simultaneously.
When considering the provisions of the Services Directive
and the e-commerce Directive, it appears to me that there is
no conflict. As far as the information requirements are con-
cerned, service providers can comply with both the transpar-
ency requirements of the e-commerce Directive60 and the
information requirements of the Services Directive simulta-
neously.61 Several of these information items even overlap
and neither instrument comprises maximum or total harmo-
nization with regard to the information duties.62 In the case
of Uber, the information requirements of the Services Direc-
tive do not apply, as transport services are excluded from the
scope of the directive, so there is no potential conflict in
relation to information requirements at all.
More important, classification of the booking-app as an in-
formation society service does not affect the Member States’
authority to regulate related transportation services, because
transportation falls outside the scope of the coordinated field
and therefore outside the scope of the freedom to provide
information society services and is also excluded from the
principle of freedom to provide services of the Services Direc-
tive.63
As regards the freedom to provide the booking-app, this is
effectively set aside by the exclusion of the transport services
from the freedom to provide services in article 2(2) sub d of
the Services Directive. This, however, is a result of the limited
scope of the coordinated field, which inevitably means that
the freedom to provide information society services will find
its limits in case online services are intrinsically related to
offline activities which are regulated on a Member State level.
X. Consequences for other platforms
Looking beyond the consequences of Asociación Profesional
Élite Taxi for Uber, this ruling potentially has far reaching
consequences for the applicability of the e-commerce Direc-
tive. The judgement essentially limits the scope of the e-
commerce Directive to independent or neutral platforms, that
is to say platforms that have no relation or interference with
the users that offer their goods or services via the platform,
nor with the contracts concluded via the platform or the
provision of the offline services.64
It could mean, for example, that if a hotel decides to add an
online booking feature to its website, this online booking
feature would be a component of the main or overall service
of providing rooms and therefor fall outside the scope of the
e-commerce Directive. And if an online platform where clea-
ners can offer their cleaning services screens and selects the
cleaners and sets certain conditions for the performance of
the cleaning service, this active role can lead to an exclusion
of the platform from the applicability of the directive.
At first sight this may seem to be to the detriment of the
active platform, because this entails that it cannot rely on the
principles relating to the freedom to provide information
society services, but the platform in the end also profits as it
does not need to comply with the transparency requirements
and the rules related to online contracting.
As a result of the ruling, to determine if an online application
constitutes an information society service it has to be deter-
mined if this service is not an integral part of an offline
activity that is considered the main component. Positively
worded, it must be examined if it has an independent eco-
nomic value.. How this test is to be performed is not specified
55 Directive (EU) 2011/83 on consumer rights [2011] OJ L 304/64.
56 Article 3(3) sub k of Directive (EU) 2011/83. The articles that are
applicable contain several key-information requirements, the prohibi-
tion to charge fees to the use of means of payment that exceed the cost
born by the traders and the obligation to obtain the consumer’s express
consent for any extra payments.
57 Platforms involved with the content of the contract and the performance
of the offline services.
58 Case C-20/03, Burmanjer [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:307, paras 34-35,
with reference to case C-71/02, Karner [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:181;
case C-390/99, Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:34; case
C-275/92, Schindler [1994] ECLI:EU:C:1994:119.
59 Article 3 of Directive (EG) 2006/123 lists several examples of Commu-
nity acts that prevail over the Services Directive, the e-commerce direc-
tive is not listed, but the list is non-exhaustive and the e-commerce
Directive can be seen as a directive governing specific aspects of a service
activity, namely information society services. In nr. 92 of his Opinion to
Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi AG Szpunar observes that Directive
(EC) 2000/31 is a lex specialis in relation to Directive (EG) 2006/123, so
that it would take precedence, albeit in keeping with the adage lex
posterior generali non derogate legi priori speciali.
60 See in particular articles 5-7 and articles 10-11 of Directive (EC) 2000/
31 and article 22 of Directive (EG) 2006/123.
61 Article 22 of Directive (EG) 2006/123.
62 See in particular article 22 (5) Directive (EG) 2006/123, article 5(2)
Directive(EC) 2000/31 and 10(1) Directive (EC) 2000/31 stating that
the information requirements apply in addition to other information
requirements established by Community law.
63 The license requirements would also fall outside the scope of the princi-
ple excluding prior authorization of the e-commerce Directive, because
this principle is limited by article 4(2) stating that this is without pre-
judice to authorization schemes which are not specifically and exclu-
sively targeted at information society services.
64 Par 34 Opinion AG Szpunar Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi mentions
as examples of this platforms for the purchase of flights or hotel book-
ings where the platform remains economically independent and the
trader pursues the platform activity separately.
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by the Court. The factors that the CJEU states in Asociación
Profesional Élite Taxi relate to the question if Uber offers
transport services, but do not specifically relate to the ques-
tion whether or not the app has an independent economic
value. Apparently, if the platform becomes involved with the
services offered via the platform in such a manner that it can
be considered the provider of these services, this automati-
cally entails that the online activity loses its independent
economic value.65
With this ruling, the CJEU has complicated the application of
the e-commerce Directive as the scope of protection is now
dependent on the assessment of the involvement of the plat-
form with the offline services offered via the platform.66
XI. Conclusion
The influence of Uber over the contracts concluded via the
booking-app and over the subsequent provision of the trans-
port services justifies that Uber is classified as a transport
service provider as meant in the Services Directive. In my
opinion this should not automatically entail that the online
application cannot be classified as an information society
service, as the CJEU did in Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi.
Possibly, the CJEU decided this in order to ensure that Uber
is excluded from the freedom to provide information society
services so that Member States remain free to regulate the
urban transport services. However, with a view to the scope
of the coordinated field (which limits the freedom to provide
information society services to the online activities) the exclu-
sion of Uber from the applicability of the e-commerce Direc-
tive is unnecessary. If the online booking-app of Uber would
be classified as an information society service, Member States
could still regulate transport services.67
From the perspective of consumer protection the exclusion is
undesirable, because it excludes active intermediary plat-
forms from the application of the transparency requirements
and the requirements relating to online contracting of the e-
commerce Directive.
Adding to this, the ruling (further) complicates the already
cryptic concept of information society service and establishes
a fragmentation in the applicability of the legal framework of
the e-commerce Directive. &
65 The division between active and independent (or neutral) intermediaries
is a division that is relevant, but in my view only for the determination
of the scope of articles 12-14 (liability of intermediary service providers).
If the platform becomes involved with the content or has some form of
control over the information on the platform, the platform cannot rely
on the exemptions of liability provided for by the e-commerce Directive,
see case C-324/09, L’Oréal v eBay [2011], nr. 113.
66 For a broader perspective on the legal challenges raised by the platform
economy see Evelyne Terryn, ‘The Sharing economy in Belgium – a case
for regulation?’[2016] 01 EuCML 45. Busch et al. propose that a
European Platform Directive is drafted specifying the scope of the exist-
ing Directives and stipulating specific rules for platforms, see Christoph
Busch, Hans Schulte-Nölke, Aneta Wiewiórowoska-Domagalska, Fry-
deryk Zoll, ‘The Rise of the Platform Economy; A new Challenge for
EU Consumer Law?’[2016] 01 EuCML par. III.2.
67 Uber B.V. is situated in the Netherlands, therefore, this Member State
should supervise if the online booking application complies with the
rules of the e-commerce directive with regard to the information require-
ments and the design of the booking procedure.
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